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Abstract. Large organizations need to align the security architecture
across three different domains: access control, network layout and phys-
ical infrastructure. Security policy specification formalisms are usually
dedicated to only one or two of these domains. Consequently, more than
one policy has to be maintained, leading to alignment problems. Ap-
proaches from the area of model-driven security enable creating graph-
ical models that span all three domains, but these models do not scale
well in real-world scenarios with hundreds of applications and thousands
of user roles. In this paper, we demonstrate the feasibility of aligning
all three domains in a single enforceable security policy expressed in a
Prolog-based formalism by using the Law Governed Interaction (LGI)
framework. Our approach alleviates the limitations of policy formalisms
that are domain-specific while helping to reach scalability by automatic
enforcement provided by LGI.
Keywords: Architectural domains, Alignment, Policy specification, Security,
Law Governed Interaction (LGI).
1 Introduction
As organizations are becoming more and more complex, with more sophisticated
information systems and information technology (IT), enterprise architecture
is becoming proportionally more important as an instrument to deal with this
complexity. Complexity in an organization has two sources: internal and external.
Internally, organizations need to manage their daily operational activities while
focusing on business development. Externally, organizations must comply with
best practices and standards such as Cobit [1] for IT governance and control,
ITIL [2] for IT delivery and support, and ISO 9000 [3] for quality management.
In addition to this internal and external pressure, traditional business drivers
like cost cutting, increasing customer satisfaction and time-to-market are also
important drivers for managing enterprise architecture.
We consider architecture as “some logical construct for defining and control-
ling the interfaces and the integration of all of the components of the system“,
Technical Report TR-CTIT-06-31
as stated by Zachman [4]. All of these components, however, do not belong to
a unique domain but instead belong to several architectural domains [4,5,6].
As a consequence, an integration problem arises because each domain involves
(i) different elements, entities and concepts, (ii) different nature and concerns,
and (iii) different stakeholders and perspectives. Therefore, a one-to-one map-
ping between architectural domains is not feasible and alternatively connecting
architectural domains evolves into an alignment problem.
In this paper, we study this alignment problem for one specific aspect: IT
security. The alignment problem in terms of security relates to the connection
of three architectural domains. First, there is the access-control domain which
involves aspects like people structured in terms of roles, objects, subjects and ac-
tions that subject can perform over objects. Second, there is the network domain
which involves communication, usage and configuration of network resources.
Finally, there is the physical domain which involves aspects like hardware, loca-
tion and mobility. Figure 1 shows a representation of these three domains and
relationships between them. It aims to provide an insight on the amount of in-
teractions involved in aligning security domains, since the diagram looks already
polluted with arrows while only a tiny number of entities is represented.
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Fig. 1. A model: three domains involved in security and example interactions
Existing approached to the alignment problem in security can be categorized
in two main streams. The first stream approaches alignment from the perspec-
tive of policy specification languages. These languages tend to be domain-specific
because the scope of access control, network and also the physical domain is so
broad and diverse. Consequently, for an integrated architecture, more than one
language is needed. Therefore, the alignment is not really achieved unless a
mapping process between these languages is used and, as a result, consistency
between them can become an issue. The other stream relies on model-driven
security [7]. It models the connections between all the elements from different
domains with the support of graphical tools and then derives security policies
through refinement between levels. One drawback of this approach is the com-
plexity of the model in real scenarios and as a consequence, it becomes hard to
analyze, considering the number of elements and connections involved.
This paper demonstrates the possibility to combine the three architectural
domains that are relevant for security in a single policy. We do so by applying
the Law Governed Interaction (LGI) framework [8] which provides means for
the formal specification of policies in a semantically flexible way. Additionally,
LGI allows cross-domain policies to be enforced in a distributed environment.
Therefore, LGI enables architectural alignment without interfaces or connections
between domains and thus avoiding drawbacks of current approaches.
We proceed presenting a motivating running example in Section 2, an overview
of LGI in Section 3 and then the LGI implementation of the example in Sec-
tion 4. In Section 5 we evaluate our approach through discuss while in Section 6
we review related work. Finally, in Section 7 we summarize our contribution.
2 Running example - overview and formalization
We use part of the IT infrastructure of a large Dutch government organization as
a running example in this paper (see Figure 21). Traditionally, this organization
employs a number of mainframes for batch-oriented transaction processing (de-
picted on the right-hand side of Figure 2). Since a few years, in addition to these
mainframes, the organization employs a modern infrastructure for Internet-based
information exchange with outside parties such as other government organiza-
tions, companies and private citizens. With this new infrastructure, these outside
parties (represented by a browser at the left-hand side of Figure 2) can directly
use, via various electronic channels, the services provided by the government
organization.
The nature of the business for which the government organization is respon-
sible is such that the data maintained by the mainframes is highly confidential
even for the employees of the government organization. Therefore, the infrastruc-
ture is organized in terms of protection perimeters which filters external, internal
and maintenance accesses to the area inside the perimeters. The maintenance
personnel is responsible for keeping the network infrastructure, hardware and
1 Based on M.Sc. thesis by Allard Hoeve, University of Twente.
software up-and-running 24 hours a day. Their work is governed by policy F
quoted below, which we formulated based on the policy description we found in
the internal security manuals of the organization.
Maintenance work shall be restricted to maintenance personnel,
in accordance to job function, and limited to trusted hosts located
on physically secured areas.
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Fig. 2. Network diagram for a large Dutch government organization
We look at this scenario focusing on the aspect of accessing the inner perime-
ters area by maintenance personnel, i.e. crossing the maintenance and also the
internal perimeters which are regulated by packet filter devices such as firewalls.
The filtering process is based on fixed rules that allow or deny access to the de-
limited area by individual Internet Protocol (IP) addresses. In our case however,
maintenance personnel should be able to overcome these rules and have these
barriers automatically open depending upon the personnel’s role and location to
enable them to do maintenance work. The location here is represented by the
combination of (i) room where the workstation to be used by the maintenance
personnel is located and (ii) socket used to plug-in the workstation into the net-
work. Although role and location are static during a maintenance session, on
the next session a same employee can represent another role and use a different
workstation from a pool, i.e. another location. As long as the employee provides
a valid digital certificate authenticating his current role and workstation location
and as long as an exception rule matches the employee’s role, location and the
server he wants to access, the filtering rule is bypassed and the access is granted
in the basis of an exception to the rule.
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Fig. 3. The large Dutch government organization model: interactions between
security domains
The enforcement of policy F comprehends entities belonging to different secu-
rity domains, as described in Section 1. Figure 3 shows a model representation of
entities relevant to our running example and their interactions. These entities are
(i) employee, server and role from the access control domain (ii) TCP/IP(v4)
packet from the network domain and (iii) location from the physical domain.
These entities are formalized in a Prolog-like2 notation as atoms. Note that the
entities related to maintenance personnel and server to be serviced are implicitly
represented inside the packet notation by source and destination IP (ips and ipd)
and port (Ps and Pd). Thus, we restrict ourselves to the representation of role,
packet and location.
role(RoleName).
packet(ips(IPs1,IPs2,IPs3,IPs4),Ps,ipd(IPd1,IPd2,IPd3,IPd4),Pd).
location(Room,Socket).
2 The choice for Prolog notation is bound to LGI framework we use.
As an example, the atoms can be instantiated as follows.
role(adminDatabase).
packet(ips(130,89,148,26),11,ipd(192,168,1,157),1050).
location(zi4026,1).
Besides entities as atoms, we represent the filtering rules and exceptions to
the rules as Prolog-like facts. Rules can be stated in terms of (i) wild card
atoms anyIP and anyPort, (ii) atoms ips and ipd for IP source and IP des-
tination, respectively, and (iii) atoms ipRangeD( , , ,rangeFrom,rangeTo) and
portRangeD(rangeFrom,rangeTo) for ranges of IP and port destination, respec-
tively. Exceptions can be stated in terms of roles, IP and port destination, lo-
cation and a permission which opposes to a rule, either in the form of allow or
deny. Note that these rules combine concepts from all three domains mentioned
in Section 1.
ruleSet(anyIP,anyPort,ipRangeD(192,168,1,0,254),portRangeD(1023,16384),allow).
ruleSet(anyIP,anyPort,ipd(192,168,1,1),anyPort,deny).
ruleSet(anyIP,anyPort,ipd(192,168,1,2),25,allow).
ruleException(role(adminDatabase),ipd(192,168,1,1),1000,location(zi3067,2),allow).
In the next section we set the basis of LGI for the implementation of the
running example.
3 Law Governed Interaction (LGI) - overview
Law-Governed Interaction (LGI) [8,9,10,11] is a coordination mechanism devel-
oped by Naftaly Minsky and colleagues at Rutgers University. LGI can be viewed
as a decentralized architecture that offers middleware components for interac-
tion between agents. These components actively monitor message exchange by
checking compliance with a formal policy set, called the law. This policy takes
the form of ECA-rules, which can be represented in either a Prolog-based or
Java-based language. In this paper, we use the Prolog-based representation. It is
important to note that Prolog rules in LGI should not be read as if-then rules.
Instead, each Prolog rule in LGI represents an ECA pattern [12] of the form: e :-
c1, ..., cn, do(o1), ..., do(on), where e is an event, c1, ..., cn is a possibly empty list
of conditions and do(o1), ..., do(on) is a list of operations (i.e. actions). Besides
the concepts of event and operation, LGI also incorporates the concept of state
(called Control State or CS) as a snapshot of an agent.
3.1 Local and distributed aspects of LGI
LGI makes available a set of regulated events and a set of primitive operations
that are triggered by events. Figure 4 shows an example interaction between two
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Fig. 4. LGI-agents interacting
computational nodes that LGI calls agents. Suppose agent x wants to send a
message to agent y. This triggers a sent event at the local controller (a mid-
dleware component that is part of LGI). When an agent triggers a sent event
containing a message, the controller uses law LF to assess whether agent x is
allowed to contact agent y. If this is the case, it is forwarded by its controller
to agent y. When the message arrives at the other agent’s controller, an arrived
event is triggered and its controller actually delivers the message if the law al-
lows it. The sent and arrived events in the controller are interpreted such that
the event is considered a Prolog goal. If the conditions are satisfied, this goal
generates a to-do list with operations provided by the command do(op), where
op represents an operation. To check a condition, a controller can consult the
so-called control state of the agent (CSx and CSy in Figure 4) by a process of
unification between a given term in the format t@CS and the content of its state.
This interpretation of the law, called in LGI the ruling of the law, is therefore
locally performed by individual controllers.
LGI controllers can enforce well-formed and available laws under the context
of each agent’s CS. They run as independent processes and thus can be placed
in any host or server in the network. Agents engage themselves at their own
discretion under a law which can regulate an entire community of so called
LGI-agents. Besides, a single controller can be shared by several agents. LGI
scalability is discussed elsewhere [13].
In summary, LGI provides a distributed enforcement of laws although their
ruling is performed locally.
3.2 Flexibility of LGI
The control state of an agent can contain any Prolog term, including atoms,
lists, and the combination of both. The semantic of these terms will be given by
the law being enforced. The same happens with the message exchanged between
agents since the semantic of its content is determined by the law under which
the agents are operating. This characteristic allows LGI to be a very flexible
coordination mechanism. Additionally, conditions under the ECA rules can be
Prolog procedures which are goals that will be satisfied or not. These procedures
take advantage of the full power of a declarative language (Prolog) and enable
sophisticated reasoning over the policy.
4 Running example - implementation in LGI
We implemented in LGI a firewall rule set subject to exceptions, as described
in Section 2, compliant with policy F . Exceptions are based on the role and
location of the user (i.e. maintenance employee) at the time he engages himself
in the law LF . For our running example scenario, we wrap maintenance utilities
such as telnet into LGI messages. We discuss next some implementation details
based on the two aspects of LGI emphasized in Section 3.
4.1 Local and distributed aspects of LGI
Figure 5 shows how LGI needs to be employed to control the network environ-
ment of the government organization. Example LGI controllers, highlighted in
the diagram, enforce law LF which allows access by maintenance personnel to
servers to be serviced based on exceptions to general firewall rules. LGI firewall
agents placed on the perimeters are responsible for filtering the requests, in the
format of packets, and decide if they should be (i) allowed to reach the destina-
tion, (ii) denied with notification sent to the sender and entry recorded in the
firewall audit log or (iii) discarded with an audit log entry.
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4.2 Flexibility of LGI
In law LF we have two kinds of agents. First, the workstations of the main-
tenance personnel who provide their current role and location (i.e. room and
socket) when engaging into the law. (The information is recorded in the agent
CS when the agent adopts the law.) Second, the firewall and the servers which do
not need to provide special information. Listing 1.1 shows an extract of law LF .
In this listing we use LGI’s variant of Prolog. This variant provides a number of
extensions to Prolog, only one of which is used in this paper: the @CS operator.
The meaning of it is as follows: a term t@CS evaluates to true if t is present in
the control state of the agent for which the rule is evaluated. The clauses follow
the format of ECA rules what means that when the event is triggered and the
conditions are met, the operations described by the do( ) atoms are executed.
By clause R2, only agents that have role and location on its CS are able to
send messages (e.g. for telnet access to a server for maintenance). In this case,
information related to the sender (i.e. role, room and socket he is using) and the
destination are re-directed to the firewall.
When the message arrives at the firewall, exceptions are checked through
the procedure checkRuleExceptions. Clauses R3 and R4 represent an if-the-else
structure where R3 will evaluate to true if an exception applies, and therefore
the permission will be retrieve from the exception fact, and R4 will evaluate to
true if no exception applies, and the permission will be ’none’. Once more the
list of information previously received, now attached with the permission and
packet in case an exception applies, is forwarded to the firewall.
Clauses R5, R6 and R7 refer to the case where permission unifies with ’none’.
Thus, the procedure checkRuleSet selects the applicable firewall rule based on the
subject and destination of the message and returns the permission and packet.
Based on the permission returned, appropriate operations will be taken depend-
ing on if the packet is allowed, denied or discarded.
Because of lack of space, clauses R8, R9 and R10 are not shown in Listing 1.1.
They are, however, similar to clauses R5, R6 and R7 although they refer to the
case where permission is already received from the exception rule. So again,
depending on the permission, the packet is allowed, denied or discarded.
As an end to the chain of forward and arrived pairs, any message arrived
from the firewall is delivered by means of clause R11.
We demonstrated by this extract of code how LGI is flexible in terms of con-
tent and semantics of agents’ CS and messages exchanged. Next we see another
extract of code in Listing 1.2, this time containing an extract of the procedure
checkRuleSet.
Clause R14 contains the goal checkRuleSet(S,D,PA,PE). S and D, which are
of the format S@domainS and D@domainD, respectively, unify with the subject
and destination of the message and will be used to retrieve their IP and port
information. PA unifies with the packet that is formed with S and D information
and PE unifies with a permission, to be retrieved from the rule set. Each rule set
has four arguments A1 to A4 in the checkRuleSet procedure: A1 corresponding
to IP source ips, A2 corresponding to source port Ps, A3 corresponding to IP
destination ipd and finally A4 corresponding to destination port Pd, as seen in
Section 2. Therefore, for each rule set, compareA1 to compareA4 are performed
to compare each rule argument with the packet. When all arguments unify, the
cut applies and the permission is returned to the main code. Listing 1.2 only
contains compareA1 (R15, R16 and R17) and compareA2 clauses (R18, R19,
R20), for brevity. The remaining six other clauses for A3 and A4 are similar to
the ones presented.
In summary, LGI is flexible enough to accept any well-formed Prolog pro-
cedure as conditions in its ECA rules. Whether access is granted is determined
dynamically in real time depending on the physical location of the workstation
and the role of the maintenance employee. It is not needed to manually open a
firewall to allow maintenance.
5 Discussion
As shown in the previous section, the middleware architecture and policy spec-
ification framework provided by LGI can be used to describe the security archi-
tecture for our running example in one integrated way across the three domains
identified in the introduction. This is done in a declarative style using event-
condition-action rules expressed in Prolog. In our example, the infrastructure
is described directly in the form of Prolog facts, but it is also possible to use
external databases as fact bases. With the appropriate interfaces, existing config-
uration databases and user directories can be used. Arbitrarily complex routines
can then be built to deal with the inherent complexity of the security setup of a
large organization. Using Prolog also provided the ground for a formal represen-
tation of policies. In addition to this, LGI provides the ability to automatically
enforce policies in a distributed environment although at the expenses of in-
stalling its middleware on all computational nodes that need to be subjected to
a policy.
According to our previous survey [14], LGI is able to express other access
control policy models such as the Mandatory Access Control (MAC) and the
Discretionary Access Control (DAC), in addition to the Role-Based Access Con-
trol Model (RBAC). Besides, it is able to express different types of access control
policies such as obligation that triggers deadline events and sanction operations
automatically, authorization and delegation. Thus, although not the focus of the
present paper, LGI is potentially able to express cross-domain policies involving
other models and types of access control as well. Future work in this direction
is in our plans.
LGI, as a coordination framework, binds the specification of policies to the
concept of message exchange. On the one hand, this way of thinking fits well
with an important type of middleware; namely message-oriented middleware.
Also modern approaches such as SOA/Web Services are often used in a message-
oriented way. On the other hand, LGI forces everything to be specified in terms
of message exchange, even when this is not intuitive. For instance, local access
control (e.g. a workstation accessing its own resources) has to be modeled in
terms of message exchange.
Despite the beneficial aspects of Prolog and LGI, the task of debugging Prolog
laws can be complex. Prolog supports debugging aids in the format of predicates
like trace, spy and even print [12]. The LGI toolkit Moses supports debugging
and testing operations like show, discloseCS and enterTest [8] and also provides a
Law Tester module. However, including working Prolog code into a LGI law code
does not necessarily result in a guaranteed success. Other sources of problem can
turn into confusing situations. As a first example, syntax errors on commands
specific to LGI such as primitive operations are not detected and causes rules
after the one which contains the problem to be ignored at run-time. As a second
example, we found out in our example that Prolog operators like => and =< are
ignored in LGI laws so, to avoid this, the interval inside a range must be tested
with > and < and then bounds must be tested separately. As a last example,
problems in a law usually disable the debugging aiding operations and it can
turn into a deadlock until the source of the problem is found.
6 Related work
Our work is both related to security policy specification languages and to model-
driven security.
In the security policy specification literature, most languages are do-
main specific. Thus, we have the domain of access control e.g. Security Policy
Language [15], Authorization Specification Language [16] and Temporal Role-
Based Access Control [17] and the domain of network e.g. Path-based Policy
Language [18], Routing Policy Specification Language [19] and Clark’s Policy
Term [20]. However, we also have some overlaps between domains. Ponder [21]
policies, for example, can combine parameters of Quality of Services (QoS) within
networks with access control elements. Additionally, a recent stream of research
is looking into physical conditions such as the location of a user in access con-
trol policies [22,23,24]. Therefore, although we can identify languages that allow
interceptions between two domains, we are not aware of any language that pro-
vides the ability to combine all these three domains in a single policy, like it is
possible with LGI.
Model-driven security uses graphic models to make the connection be-
tween architectural domains explicit. Luck et al. [25] propose a graphical tool
which allows linking elements from different domains resulting in configuration
files that can be implemented by the Linux kernel extension IPchains. Their
approach has two drawbacks. The first drawback is visual pollution which com-
promises administration and scalability when representing real-life network en-
vironments. Albuquerque et al. realized this gap and proposed an intermediate
level of abstraction to their model [7,26]. However, still a one to one relationship
between the number of objects in this level and the number of users remains.
Therefore, probably in large organizations the number of connections between
objects and users would not be understandable graphically. Second, it seems
that the rules generated automatically [7] by the model will be imported as
files to be enforced by IPchains. Therefore, if the model changes, rule files will
have to be changed manually. Furthermore, rules at the level of IPchains do
not understand the abstractions of the upper levels of the model, thus in the
model-based approach we have a refinement process and not an alignment of
domains in the sense that we cannot use elements of different domains concur-
rently in a combined policy. In summary, by looking at available model-driven
security approaches we observe that: (i) they are not scalable in terms of the
amount of cross-domain connections to be represented graphically, (ii) they are
not enforced in terms of automatic configuration of network resources and (iii)
they are based on refinement and so policies are derived at the lower level and
cannot combine elements from the upper levels. Our approach, however, avoids a
high level of granularity by dealing directly with roles on exception rules. Addi-
tionally, the policy can be enforced on any node across the network, considering
LGI controllers are installed on all computational nodes involved. Finally, we
can deal with elements from three domains without restrictions.
7 Conclusion
IT security in large organizations spans three architectural domains: access con-
trol, network layout and physical infrastructure. It is important that these do-
mains are kept aligned as a way to manage the growing complexity of organiza-
tions. Current approaches in the area of policy specification and model-driven
security either do not allow for the combination of elements from all these dif-
ferent domains in a single policy or suffer from the scalability of a graphical
representation. We have demonstrated in this paper the ability to specify and
enforce a cross-domain policy using a framework called Law Governed Interac-
tion (LGI), which provides a modeling framework that alleviates these problems.
LGI is flexible enough while still preserving the benefits of formal specification
and automatic enforcement.
As future work, we intend to compare LGI, as a formal specification language
based on Prolog, with Alloy [27], a first-order formal specification language. The
goal is to discuss benefits and drawbacks of each approach based on running
examples involving interactions between agents. More specifically, we want to
investigate the preventive characteristic of LGI at policy run-time, achieved by
governing agents according to a law, against the detective characteristic of Alloy
at policy design-time, achieved by the possibility to reason about policy incon-
sistencies for example.
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Listing 1.1. Extract from law LF
R2 . sent ( Source , Message , Dest ) : − r o l e ( Role )@CS,
l o c a t i o n (Room, Socket )@CS,
do ( forward ( Source , [ Message , Dest , Role ,Room, Socket ] , f i r e w a l l ) ) .
R3 . a r r i v ed ( Source , [ Message , Dest , Role ,Room, Socket ] , f i r e w a l l ) :−
checkRuleExceptions ( Source , Dest ,
[ r o l e ( Role ) , l o c a t i o n (Room, Socket ) ] , Permiss ion , Packet ) ,
do ( forward ( Source , [ Message , Packet , Dest , Role ,Room, Socket , Permiss ion ] ,
f i r e w a l l ) ) .
R4 . a r r i v ed ( Source , [ Message , Dest , Role ,Room, Socket ] , f i r e w a l l ) :−
not ( checkRuleExceptions ( Source , Dest ,
[ r o l e ( Role ) , l o c a t i o n (Room, Socket ) ] , Permiss ion , Packet ) ) ,
do ( forward ( Source , [ Message , Dest , Role ,Room, Socket , none ] , f i r e w a l l ) ) .
R5 . a r r i v ed ( Source , [ Message , Dest , Role ,Room, Socket , none ] , f i r e w a l l ) :−
checkRuleSet ( Source , Dest , Permiss ion , Packet ) ,
( Permiss ion=al low ) ,
do ( forward ( f i r ew a l l , Message , Dest ) ) .
R6 . a r r i v ed ( Source , [ Message , Dest , Role ,Room, Socket , none ] , f i r e w a l l ) :−
checkRuleSet ( Source , Dest , Permiss ion , Packet ) ,
( Permiss ion=deny ) ,
do ( add ( auditRecord ( [ packetDenied , Packet ] ) ) ) ,
do ( forward ( f i r ew a l l , [ packetDenied , Packet ] , Source ) ) .
R7 . a r r i v ed ( Source , [ Message , Dest , Role ,Room, Socket , none ] , f i r e w a l l ) :−
checkRuleSet ( Source , Dest , Permiss ion , Packet ) ,
not ( Permiss ion=al low ) , not ( Permiss ion=deny ) ,
do ( add ( auditRecord ( [ packetDiscarded , Packet ] ) ) ) .
.
.
.
R11 . a r r i v ed ( f i r ew a l l ,Any ,Any) : − do ( d e l i v e r ) .
Listing 1.2. Extract from law LF - procedure checkRuleSet
R14 . checkRuleSet (S ,D,PE,PA) :−
dnsPortLookup (S , IPs1 , IPs2 , IPs3 , IPs4 , Ps ) ,
dnsPortLookup (D, IPd1 , IPd2 , IPd3 , IPd4 ,Pd) ,
PA=packet ( i p s ( IPs1 , IPs2 , IPs3 , IPs4 ) , Ps ,
ipd ( IPd1 , IPd2 , IPd3 , IPd4 ) ,Pd) ,
r u l eS e t (A1 ,A2 ,A3 ,A4 ,PE) ,
compareA1 (PA,A1) ,
compareA2 (PA,A2) ,
compareA3 (PA,A3) ,
compareA4 (PA,A4 ) , ! .
R15 . compareA1 ( packet ( i p s ( IPs1 , IPs2 , IPs3 , IPs4 ) ,X,Y,Z) ,
anyIP ) .
R16 . compareA1 ( packet ( i p s ( IPs1 , IPs2 , IPs3 , IPs4 ) ,X,Y,Z) ,
i p s ( IPs1 , IPs2 , IPs3 , IPs4 ) ) .
R17 . compareA1 ( packet ( i p s ( IPs1 , IPs2 , IPs3 , IPs4 ) ,X,Y,Z) ,
ipRangeS ( IPs1 , IPs2 , IPs3 , IPs4From , IPs4To )) : −
( IPs4 => IPs4From ) , ( IPs4 =< IPs4To ) .
R18 . compareA2 ( packet (W, Ps ,Y,Z) ,
anyPort ) .
R19 . compareA2 ( packet (W, Ps ,Y,Z) ,
Ps ) .
R20 . compareA2 ( packet (W, Ps ,Y,Z) ,
portRangeS (PsFrom , PsTo)) : −
(Ps > PsFrom ) , ( Ps < PsTo ) .
